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Abstract. Biometric templates are subject to modifications for identity fraud 
especially when they are stored in databases. In this paper, a new approach to 
protecting biometric templates with image watermarking techniques is 
proposed. The novelty of this approach is that we have combined lattice and 
block-wise image watermarking techniques to maintain image quality along 
with cryptographic techniques to embed fingerprint templates into facial images 
and vice-versa. Thus, protecting them from being modified. 
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1   Introduction 
Visual based biometric systems use feature extraction algorithms to extract the 
discriminant information that is invariant to as many variations embedded in the raw 
data (e.g. scaling, translation, rotation) as possible. Template-based methods crop a 
particular subimage (the template) from the original sensory image, and extract 
features from the template by applying global-level processing, without a priori 
knowledge of the object’s structural properties. Compared to geometric feature 
extraction algorithms, image template approaches need to locate far fewer points to 
obtain a correct template. For example, in the probabilistic decision-based neural 
network (PDBNN) face recognition system, only two points (left and right eyes) need 
to be located to extract a facial recognition template. An early comparison between 
the two types of feature extraction methods was made by Brunelli and Poggio [1]. 
They found the template approach to be faster and able to generate more accurate 
recognition results than the geometric approach. 
In practice, there is not always a perfect match between templates and individuals. 
One speaks of a false positive if the biometric recognition system says 'yes', but the 
answer should be 'no'. A false negative works the other way round: the system says 
'no', where it should be a 'yes'. One of the main challenges with biometric systems is 
to minimise the rates of both false positives and of false negatives. In theory one is 
inclined to keep the false positives low, but in practical situations it often works the 
other way round: people that operate these systems dislike false negatives, because 
they slow down the process and result in extra work and people complaining.  
A potential protection approach of biometric templates is feasible with image 
watermarking techniques in visual-based biometric systems. Watermarking 
techniques attempt to protect the copyrights of any digital medium by embedding a 
unique pattern or message within the original information. The embedding method 
involves the use of a number of different authentication, encryption and hash 
algorithms and protocols to achieve the validity and copy protection of the particular 
message.  
One of the most important requirements of watermarking is the perceptual 
transparency between the original work and the watermarked. Especially for images 
that objective metrics are widely used [6]. The watermark message may have a higher 
or lower level of perceptibility, meaning that there is a greater or lesser likelihood that 
a given observer will perceive the difference. 
In this paper, we apply watermarking techniques to biometric templates to 
overcome serious cases of identity theft. In particular, we embed a person’s 
fingerprint template into his facial image with the form of a cryptographic encoder 
that utilizes encryption algorithms, hash functions and digital signatures. Once the 
facial image has been watermarked, it can be stored in public databases without 
risking an identity modification or fabrication.    
Following this introduction, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
current work that combine watermarking and biometrics techniques. Section 3 
discusses the requirements for efficient watermarking and briefly describes lattice and 
block-wise embedding methods and how these can be used along with cryptographic 
techniques to protect biometric templates. Section 4 evaluates the performance and 
the efficiency of the two embedding methods, through simulation tests. Section 5 
concludes with remarks and comments on the open issues in watermarking and 
biometric templates. 
2   Related Work 
Current research efforts in combining watermarking techniques and visual-based 
biometric systems follow a hierarchical approach, with the most explored area being 
that of biometrics. Watermarking techniques on the other hand have been explored 
less in conjunction with biometrics templates. Despite the fact that several attempts of 
combining watermarking techniques and biometric systems have already been 
proposed. 
In Lucilla et al. [5], a technique for the authentication of ID cardholders is 
presented, which combines dynamic signature verification with hologram 
watermarks. Two biometric features are already integral parts of ID cards for manual 
verification: the user’s face and signature. This technique embeds dynamic features of 
the cardholder’s signature into the personal data printed on the ID card, thereby 
facilitating automated user authentication based on the embedded information. Any 
modification of the image can also be detected and will further disallow the biometric 
verification of the forger. 
Jain and Uludag [2] worked with hiding fingerprint minutiae in images. For this 
purpose, they considered two application scenarios: A set of fingerprint minutiae is 
transferred as the watermark of an arbitrary image and a face image is watermarked 
with fingerprint minutiae. In the first scenario, the fingerprint minutiae are transferred 
via a non-secure channel hidden in an arbitrary image. Before being embedded into 
the host image, the fingerprint minutiae are encrypted, which further increases the 
security of the data. The produced image is sent through the insecure communication 
channel. In the end, the image is received and the fingerprint minutiae are extracted, 
decrypted and ready for any further processing.  
In the second scenario, a face scan is watermarked with fingerprint minutiae data 
and the result is encoded in a smart card. For the authentication of a user, the image is 
retrieved from the smart card, the fingerprint minutiae are extracted from it and they 
are compared to the minutiae obtained from the user online. The user is authenticated 
based on the two fingerprint minutiae data sets and the face image. 
Jain et al. [3] have presented a fingerprint image watermarking method that can 
embed facial information into host fingerprint images. The considered application 
scenario in this case is as follows: The fingerprint image of a person is watermarked 
with face information of the same person and stored on a smart card. At an access 
control site, the fingerprint of the user is sensed and compared with the one stored on 
the smart card. After the fingerprint matching has successfully been completed, the 
facial information can be extracted from the fingerprint image on the smart card and 
can be used for further authentication purposes. 
3   Combining Image Watermarking Techniques with Visual Based 
Biometric Systems 
Visual-based biometric systems use feature extraction techniques to collect unique 
facial patterns and create biometric templates. However, biometric templates are 
subject to fraud especially in passport cloning and illegal immigration. Image 
watermarking techniques along with cryptographic primitives can be used to verify 
the authenticity of a person and also detect any modification to biometric templates 
when these are securely stored. 
Biometric templates of a fingerprint and a face scan can be hashed and encrypted 
with cryptographic algorithms and then embedded into an image. For example, with 
the use of hash functions and encryption methods, the owner of a facial image can 
embed his/her template. The recipient can extract it by decrypting it and therefore can 
verify that the received image was the one intended by the sender. Encrypting and 
hashing watermarked information can guarantee the authentication of the owner and 
the image itself since the purpose of watermarks is two-fold: (i) they can be used to 
determine ownership, and (ii) they can be used to detect tampering. 
There are two necessary features that all watermarks must possess [7]. First, all 
watermarks should be detectable. In order to determine ownership, it is imperative 
that one be able to recover the watermark. Second, watermarks must be robust to 
various types of processing of the signal (i.e. cropping, filtering, translation, 
compression, etc.). If the watermark is not robust, it serves little purpose, as 
ownership will be lost upon processing. Another important requirement for 
watermarks is the perceptual transparency between the original work and the 
watermarked; and for images objective metrics are widely used. The watermarked 
message may have a higher or lower level of perceptibility, meaning that there is a 
greater or lesser likelihood that a given observer will perceive the difference. The 
ideal is to be as imperceptible as possible and it is required to develop models that are 
used to compare two different versions of the works and evaluate any alterations. 
Evaluating the perceptibility of the watermarks can be done with distortion metrics. 
These distortion metrics do not exploit the properties of the human visual system 
but they provide reliable results. Also, there is an objective criterion that relies on the 
sensitivity of the eye and is called Watson perceptual distance. It is also known as just 
noticeable differences and consists of a sensitivity function, two masking components 
based on luminance, contrast masking, and a pooling component. Table I gives the 
metrics that are used more often. 
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There are plenty of image watermarking techniques available in the literature but we 
have combined lattice and semi-fragile, or block-wise, embedding methods to take 
advantage of their unique features. Briefly, the lattice watermarking system embeds 
only one bit per 256 pixels in an image. Each bit is encoded using the trellis code and 
produces a sequence of four bits. The trellis coding is a convolution code and the 
number of states is 23=8 with possible outputs 24=16. After the encoding procedure, 
the bits need to be embedded in 256 pixels which means that each of the four bits is 
embedded in 256/4=64 pixels [6].  
The block-wise method involves the basic properties of the JPEG compression 
where DCT domain takes place. Four bits are embedded in the high-frequency DCT 
of each 8x8 (64 pixels) block in the image and not in the low-frequency in order to 
avoid any visual differences that would lead to unacceptably poor fidelity. By using 
the block-wise method, the image can host 16 times more information than lattice. 
Specifically 28 coefficients are used which means that each bit is embedded in seven 
coefficients. The seven coefficients that host one bit are chosen randomly according 
to a seed number and thus, each coefficient is involved in only one bit [6].  
By combing the two methods, we can exploit their advantages particularly, in 
circumstances where both the quality and the ability to notice the corrupted blocks is 
essential. In an image, the part that is likely to be illegally altered is watermarked with 
the block-wise method while the rest of the image is watermarked with the lattice 
method. In a facial image, for example, the areas of the eyes, mouth and jaw can be 
used to embed the fingerprint template. The round area of the face can be used to 
embed additional information, such as the name and/or address of the person shown 
in the photo with the lattice method. If an adversary changes for example the color of 
the eyes or some characteristics of the face (e.g. adding a moustache) the combined 
algorithm is able to determinate the modified pixels. This is achieved by comparing 
the extracted message with the original.  
The combination of the two embedding methods is implemented in a 
cryptographic encoder-decoder. The authority that wishes to protect a face or 
fingerprint photo, extracts the biometric template(s) of that person and along with a 
short description and a unique feature of the image are inserted in a hash function and 
the result is encrypted with a 1024-bit secret key. The signature, together with the 
short and the extracted unique description, is embedded with the lattice method while 
the biometric template is embedded with the block-wise algorithm. As a unique 
description we have used the sum of the pixel values of the four blocks in the corners. 
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) and the Rivest, Shamir, Aldeman (RSA) [8] have 
been used to hash and sign the fingerprint template, short and unique descriptions. 
The design of the encoder is illustrated in Fig. 1a. 
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(a)      (b) 
Fig. 1. Cryptographic Encoder / Decoder 
From the watermarked version of the image, at the decoder’s side, the signature, the 
short and unique descriptions are extracted with the lattice method while the 
biometric template is extracted with the block-wise algorithm. Then, the unique 
description is compared with the extracted one. Thus, the first step is to verify 
whether the unique descriptions match. In the case of the watermark being copied and 
embedded in another image, the extracted description will not be the same. This is 
due to the fact that the pixel values of the image have been slightly changed to host 
the watermark, the extracted description cannot be exactly the same, but can be very 
close. Therefore, some upper and lower boundaries have been determined for this step 
of verification.  
The next step is to decrypt the signature using the 1024-bit RSA public key and 
retrieve the hash value. The biometric template, short and unique descriptions that 
have been extracted, is again the input to the hash function. The obtained hash value 
is then compared with the one decrypted from the signature. The third step of the 
decoder is to verify whether the decrypted hash value matches exactly with the one 
calculated by the decoder. If both hash values and unique descriptions are valid, the 
authentication process is successful. The whole design of the decoder is presented in 
Fig. 1b. 
4   Experimental Results 
In order to evaluate the performance and the efficiency of the embedding methods, 
excessive tests have taken place. A number of cases have been considered each with a 
different variable parameter. A grayscale bitmap image with 300x300 (Fig. 2a) 
resolution has been used for the experiments. The difference between the original and 
the watermarked image was evaluated by the ideal values of the original image that 
are presented in Table II.  
Table II. Ideal Values of the test Image 
Quality Measurements Ideal Values Quality Measurements Ideal Values 
MSE 0 NC 1 
SNR (dB) 97 CQ 129.923 
PSNR (dB) 104 Watson Distance 0 
IF 100  
 
Cases have also been considered once again each with a different variable parameter, 
independent of lattice and block-wise methods in order to maintain image quality. 
When combined image watermarking is performed, a small part of the image is 
watermarked with the block-wise method and the rest is watermarked with the lattice 
method. We assume that the most vulnerable to illegal modifications, is the small 
part. The biometric template is embedded in the small part while the short and 
extracted descriptions are embedded in the large part of the image. The experimental 
tests of the quality measurements were performed using: only lattice; only block-wise; 
combined block-wise and lattice. 
It was found that the lattice method achieves better results than the block-wise and 
expected that the produced result values of the combined case would be in between 
the values of those produced by the two methods. Particularly, in the case of the 
lattice algorithm the maximum number of the embedded bit can be 351 (one bit per 
256 pixels). The formulas that are used to evaluate the differences between two 
images are presented in Table I. The tests were executed using a range of values for 
the parameter in order to conclude what the best values are. The parameters are the 
embedding strength (β) and the lattice spacing (α). The range of the α value was from 
0.35 to 5.33 and the range of β from 0.7 to 1.1. The incensement steps for a was 0.02 
and for β 0.1.  
The measurement values for the lattice method are very close to the ideal ones. 
More specifically, the direction towards zero is achieved using low values of α in the 
case of MSE. If at the same time the value of β that is used is low, the MSE is 
decreased even further. In the case of SNR and PSNR, the result values are higher 
when the parameters α and β are low. The image fidelity (IF), which is defined as a 
percentage of how identical the images are, the value of 100% is considered to be the 
optimum and as can be noticed from Table III, the results are very close to this. 
Utilizing the NC and the CQ quality measurements, it is observed that their 
measurements are closer to the ideal ones (Table II), as the values of α and β are 
decreased. The above observations are also justified from the Watson measurement 
which is based on luminance, contrast, and pooling masking. 
Table III. Results From Lattice, Block-Wise and Combined Embedding Methods  
alpha(a)=0.93, 
beta(β)=1.0, 
alpha(a)=0.1 
Lattice 
alpha(a), 
beta(β) 
Block-
Wise 
alpha(a) 
Combined 
alpha(a),beta(β)
alpha(a) 
MSE 0.353 1.428 0.389 
SNR 47.13 39.33 45.14 
PSNR 53.27 45.29 52.52 
IF 99.969 99.983 99.966 
NC 0.99999 0.99992 0.99994 
CQ 129.925 129.916 129.922 
Watson-
Distance 31.436 58.262 32.453 
(a) 
alpha(a)=1.53, 
beta(β)=0.8,  
alpha(a) =0.2 
Lattice 
alpha(a), beta(β) 
Block-Wise 
alpha(a) 
Combined 
alpha(a),beta(β), alpha(a) 
MSE 0.545 4.951 0.72 
SNR 43.18 33.62 41.97 
PSNR 50.77 41.18 49.55 
IF 99.9952 99.9563 99.9936 
NC 0.99998 0.99985 0.99998 
CQ 129.921 129.903 129.921 
Watson-Distance 48.901 157.506 49.136 
(b) 
Therefore, it could be suggested that the optimum parameter values are those that give 
the best results. They could even be the zero values. But at the decoder’s side not all 
the bits are extracted correctly. Specifically when using low values of α and β, the 
decoder is not able to get the correct embedded bits. In conclusion it can be said that a 
trade-off between the quality results and the decoder’s result is necessary in order to 
determine the optimum values. From the tests we concluded that suggested values 
could be α ≈ 1.53 and β = 0.8 (Table IIIb). 
Similarly, in the case of the block-wise method, the tests were executed for the 
same image in order to be comparable with those of the lattice method. One major 
difference is the number of bits that are embedded. Since the method embeds four bits 
in every 64 pixels and the image has 90000 pixels in total, the number of bits can be 
hosted in 5625. The size of the information that can be watermarked is significantly 
higher and in fact is 16 times greater than the size in the lattice method. Therefore, 
before even executing the test, it is expected that the results will not be as good. The 
information in the block-wise method is much more, which means that the alterations 
in the image will produce worse values in the quality measurements.  
The observation of the results proves what is being stated in the beginning. The 
values of the quality measurements are not as good in comparison with those of the 
lattice method since the measurement of the MSE is higher than the ideal value, 
which is zero. The values of the SNR and PSNR, which are widely used, show that as 
the value of the parameter alpha (a) is increased, the result becomes worse. In the case 
of the IF, NC, and CQ, the measurements seem to be distant from the ideal values as 
alpha (a) takes higher values. The same conclusion can be phrased for the perceptual 
distance given by the Watson model, where the results are worse as the value of alpha 
(a) is increased. 
It seems that as the value of alpha is increased, the watermarked image has poorer 
fidelity. So the optimum value of the parameter should perhaps possibly be a small 
one e.g. 0.01. However, it seems that values below 0.05 do not allow the decoder to 
get the right message. The chosen value of alpha depends on how sensitive the user 
wants the method to be in order to locate the corrupted bits and mark the 
corresponding blocks. Higher values increase the sensitivity but at the same time the 
quality of the image is reduced. So it is again necessary to make a trade-off between 
the results and the sensitivity. A possible suggested value could be a ≈ 0.2 (Table 
IIIb). 
Indeed the results were not as good as those of the lattice method but they were 
better than those of the block-wise method. In Table III some result values of the 
combination are given in order to compare them with those of the two methods when 
they are applied individually. Table III justifies that the combination produces quality 
measurements between the two methods. Table IV presents the maximum number of 
bits that can be hosted in the image using the two embedding methods and a 
combination of them. 
Table IV. Maximum Number of Embedded Bits 
 Lattice Block-Wise Combined 
Max Embedded Bits 351 5625 2752 
 
The last test was to verify that in case somebody modifies the block-wise part of 
the image, which is the biometric template, the decoder realizes the modification, 
informs the authority that the authentication application failed and outputs a file with 
the modified blocks marked. The part that is likely to be illegally altered is the eyes or 
jaw and the biometric template(s) of the facial and/or fingerprint images which are 
embedded with the block-wise method (Fig. 2b). In the watermarked version the 
distance between the eyes was changed and this image was inserted in the decoder in 
order to verify its authenticity. The authentication process failed and a marked image 
was produced (Fig. 2c). By observing the last image it is clear that the decoder has 
successfully located the modified blocks.  
   
            (a)                 (b)           (c)                              
Fig. 2. Original Image (a), Watermarked Image (a), Marked Image (c) 
 
Throughout the paper we have considered the case where a fingerprint and/or facial 
template is embedded into a facial image. That does not mean that a facial image 
cannot be embedded with our method into a fingerprint image, which is illustrated in 
Fig. 3. Similar to Fig. 2, Fig. 3a is the original image, Fig. 3b is the watermarked and 
Fig. 3c is the marked image generated by our testbed. 
 
 
   
       (a)             (b)                   (c) 
Fig. 3. Original Image (a), Watermarked Image (a), Marked Image (c) 
 
The potential danger with sensitive databases containing biometric identifiers, such as 
facial, fingerprint images and templates, is that they are likely to be attacked by 
hackers or criminals. Watermarking the information in these databases can allow the 
integrity of the contents to be verified. Another danger is that this critical data can be 
attacked while it is being transmitted. For example, a third party could intercept this 
data and maliciously alter the data before re-transmitting it to its final destination. The 
transmission problem is even more critical in cellular and wireless channels. The 
channels themselves are quite noisy and can degrade the signal quality.  
Additionally, data transmitted through wireless channels is far from secure as they 
are omni-directional, and as such can be eavesdropped with relative ease. The growth 
of the wireless market and e-commerce applications for PDAs requires a robust 
cryptographic method for data security. There are compact solid state sensors already 
available in the market, which can capture fingerprints or faces for the purpose of 
identity verification. These devices can also be easily attached to PDAs and other 
hand-held cellular devices for use in identification and verification.  
Considering all the noise and distortion in cellular channels, our combined 
watermarking technique along with the cryptographic encoder/decoder will mainly 
work in smudging, compression and filtering. Our cryptographic encoder/decoder will 
only fail when noise and distortion is detected in the sensitive areas of the images that 
have been embedded with the block-wise algorithm. If our watermarked image is 
transferred in a noisy channel, then we need to reduce the amount of information 
inserted with the block-wise method to have a high rate of success.    
5   Conclusion 
Watermarking biometric data is of growing importance as more robust methods of 
verification and authentication are being used. Biometrics provides the necessary 
unique characteristics but their validity must be ensured. This can be guaranteed to an 
extent by watermarks. Unfortunately, they cannot provide a foolproof solution 
especially when the transmission of data is involved. A receiver can not always 
determine whether or not he has received the correct data without the sender giving 
access to critical information (i.e., the watermark). 
In this paper we have presented a cryptographic encoder/decoder that digitally 
signs biometric templates, which are embedded with combined lattice and block-wise 
image watermarking techniques into an image. Combining image watermarking 
techniques with cryptographic primitives enables us to protect biometric templates 
that have been generated by a visual-based biometric system without any distortion of 
the image. Since biometric templates are essential tools for authenticating people, it is 
necessary to protect them for possible alterations and fabrications in conjunction with 
their biometric image(s) when these are stored in private/public databases. 
Image watermarking techniques in conjunction with cryptographic primitives 
provide a powerful tool to authenticate an image, its biometric template and any 
additional information that is considered important according to a particular 
application. In the passport-based scenario, for example, the photograph and the 
private information (i.e. name/address) of an individual can be protected with the 
proposed approach. Our results showed that we can combine watermarking 
techniques to securely embed private information in a biometric image without fading 
it out.    
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